Stuart Eizenstat on President Carter\u2019s Morality: Episodes From an Administration<\/p>\n
\u00a0Leslie C. Griffin*<\/a><\/p>\n Stuart Eizenstat\u2019s 999-page book, President Carter: The White House Years, <\/em>promises to \u201credeem his presidency from the lingering memories.\u201d[1]<\/a> The book has put President Jimmy Carter back in the news. Eizenstat was present for most of Carter\u2019s political career. He started with Carter\u2019s gubernatorial campaign in 1970 Georgia and then served as domestic policy director in the Carter White House.<\/p>\n Eizenstat concludes Carter was a \u201cgood and productive\u201d president who produced a lasting record of accomplishments. [2]<\/a> He has prepared a powerful critique and praise of his former boss, offering the \u201cnegatives along with the positives\u201d that make Carter\u2019s record worth re-considering.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n The moral aspects of the story are especially interesting to me. Everyone has always connected Carter with morality. We learn at times in this book how his advisor thinks Carter\u2019s commitment to morality worked in presidential practice. It turns out it was good sometimes, and bad others. Eizenstat thinks Carter was a great moralist, but could have been a better politician. As he writes,<\/p>\n Jimmy Carter did not have the grace of John Kennedy, the congressional wizardry of Lyndon Johnson, the strategic vision of Richard Nixon, the charm and clarity of purpose of Ronald Reagan, the foreign-policy experience of George H. W. Bush, the supreme political skills of Bill Clinton, the toughness of George W. Bush, or the eloquence of Barack Obama. But he brought to the Oval Office his own unique intellect, inquisitiveness, self-discipline, political courage, and resilience in the face of setbacks. He disregarded the political costs<\/em> of trying to make the nation and the world a better place in ways that transcended his presidency and often did not come to fruition until he left office.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Throughout the book, we see the Carter who repeatedly \u201cdisregarded the political costs\u201d of his moral choices. Eizenstat gives recurrent examples of the \u201cquintessential Jimmy Carter, doing what he considered \u2018the right thing\u2019 regardless of the political consequences\u201d.[5]<\/a> To those of us who care about morality, it sounds like a good thing to be a stubborn and tenacious president who believed the American people would reward him with their votes for doing the right thing, and not for considering the political aspects of his job.<\/p>\n The book, however, tells us the lesson was more complex because Carter\u2019s \u201cinsistence on immediately tackling the tough challenges, regardless of political costs and competing priorities, was at once his strength and weakness<\/em>\u201d.[6]<\/a> Seeing things that way provides some practical lessons about presidential ethics. Eizenstat wants us to understand that \u201cit is hard to think of a president with so many unheralded and indeed pathbreaking accomplishments who nevertheless got so little political credit for the kudos\u201d.[7]<\/a> For example, Carter saved both New York from bankruptcy and thousands of union jobs; nonetheless Mayor Koch turned against Carter and the UAW endorsed Ted Kennedy for president.<\/p>\n Recently, the Washington Post <\/em>ran an article<\/a>[8]<\/u><\/a> that confirms some of the lessons of Eizenstat\u2019s book. Unlike other presidents, who acquired a lot of post-presidential assets and now cost a lot of money to support, Carter is back in his old home, in Plains, Georgia, living much more simply than the others. He says \u201c[i]t just never had been my ambition to be rich.\u201d He and his wife, Rosalynn, cook their dinner at home, and he even does the dishes! Carter flies commercial planes, and was seen recently shaking hands with all the people sitting down on the plane as he boarded his flight. Eizenstat is quoted in that story, saying Carter \u201cdidn\u2019t feel suited to the grandeur [of the White House]. . . . Plains is really part of his DNA. He carried it into the White House, and he carried it out of the White House.\u201d<\/p>\n We learn from the book that morality may be good over the long run. But it is frequently a mistake to ignore the political implications of a political job, as Carter did repeatedly. You at least pay the cost of that choice when you run for reelection.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n My Interest in Carter<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n My background explains my perspective on Jimmy Carter. I have a long interest in President Carter because of my academic interest in ethics. I wrote an article in 1989 about the problem of dirty hands, which asks if politicians can be moral.[9]<\/a> Christians have long debated that question. Some say to stay out of politics and be morally pure. Others recommend going into politics. But then they disagree again. Go into politics and be immoral. \u00a0Go into politics and follow a political morality that is different from personal morality. Go into politics and apply a common morality to personal and political choices.<\/p>\n The use of violence helps explain the differences. Should Christians stay out of politics because they may have to order the use of force? Or should they be politicians, who use force immorally or morally, still disagreeing about what the morality should be?<\/p>\n Carter\u2019s life experience shows that, as a good Christian, he had debated whether to go into politics and what morality to follow there. At the time he was president, it looked like he believed that the same moral principles should regulate personal and political life. I admired politicians like Jimmy Carter for their characters and didn\u2019t understand when others criticized their conduct. I believed that Carter was always trying to figure out the right thing to do, meaning that he was trying to keep his hands from getting dirty, and that was a good moral choice.<\/p>\n Stuart Eizenstat tells a more complex story, showing that Carter\u2019s morality failed\u2014and succeeded. It may have failed because he reflected much more on morality than on politics. From Eizenstat we learn a more complicated story than many of the ones told to date. Commentators have already raised the possibility that this book and time will enhance Carter\u2019s record. Eizenstat at least tells a story that morality might work in the long run, as long as reelection is not the politician\u2019s primary goal.<\/p>\n Post-Carter, and due in large part to his influence, the country\u2019s government became more religious. Americans elected several presidents who campaigned on their Christian faith and championed pro-religion policies as president. Carter had opened the door to so much faith by being so publicly religious, even though, as a Southern Baptist, he personally believed in the separation of church and state.[10]<\/a> The book raises questions about such a religion-based administration. From history\u2019s perspective, it looks good that Carter was so moral. But his actions did make it possible for his successors to be even more directly religious. That approach may divide the nation into blocs of religious believers united by faith instead of a whole nation bound to a common constitution.<\/p>\n Eizenstat\u2019s book is not surprising. It confirms what we suspected, namely that Carter\u2019s moral and religious commitments were often more important than his political ones. Repeatedly Carter went forward with action despite its political costs. The book shows that lasting accomplishments can come out of a commitment to ethical principles. It leaves open the questions of whether compromise and political focus could accomplish even more. That is really the problem of dirty hands, of course, asking if a president can be morally and politically successful at the same time.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Eizenstat\u2019s Stories<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Moral President <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Unsurprisingly, Eizenstat\u2019s Introduction establishes Carter as a man of \u201cessential integrity\u201d,[11]<\/a> who had a \u201cstern morality,\u201d[12]<\/a>, was \u201cuncomfortable with compromising what seemed to him so obviously the right course\u201d,[13]<\/a> and \u201cran an honest administration\u201d.[14]<\/a> That morality was Carter\u2019s strength as well as his fault. Eizenstat rebuts the idea that Carter was \u201cweak and hapless\u2019\u201d,[15]<\/a> instead arguing that Carter\u2019s one term was \u201cone of the most consequential in modern history\u201d.[16]<\/a> We learn from page one forward that Carter\u2019s morality was both a virtue and a vice. It inspired many of his choices. But it also persuaded him to pursue them in the wrong way. Although Carter had been politically shrewd enough to\u2014surprisingly\u2014win the 1976 election, he did not act as a politician once elected.<\/p>\n Why not? Probably because of morality. On morality, Eizenstat says, Carter was \u201ca man of almost unyielding principle,\u201d[17]<\/a> who \u201ccould break before he would bend his principles or abandon his personal loyalties\u201d.[18]<\/a> As president, he made what he thought was the right choice<\/em>, based strictly on the merits of the question. He thought the people would agree with his choices and back him politically because his choices were correct. Unfortunately, Eizenstat explains, presidents should be \u201cpolitician[s] in chief\u201d if they want to be reelected.<\/p>\n One of Carter\u2019s greatest moral weaknesses was in pursuing too much, instead of just enough or too little. Carter himself later said he would have had a more impressive image of accomplishment if he had focused on fewer issues. But he did not. He picked many important issues, and, according to Eizenstat, succeeded on some of them. But for many of his choices, success appeared only long after he had left the presidency, defeated in his efforts to win a second term.<\/p>\n One of Carter\u2019s weaknesses was \u201ccompartmentalizing of decisions\u201d.[19]<\/a> He focused completely on the details of his policies. He knew the details as well as anyone, instead of leaving such information to his cabinet members or staff. The details method replaced a more usual political method of getting some voters on board and other people to do the work. As Eizenstat concludes, \u201cHis insistence on knowing everything about an issue before he made a decision was his quintessential method of governing\u201d<\/em>.[20]<\/a> Carter knew more than many other people about an issue. For that reason, he didn\u2019t encourage personal relationships with members of Congress or promise to be there when they needed him. Instead, he was almost always focused on the right thing on paper and as an idea.<\/p>\n The detail emphasis made Carter very different from his more political vice president, Walter Mondale. Mondale knew from his long congressional experience that the president does not get deference because he has the best ideas. Mondale looked at politics differently, and understood why the president thought people would not listen to him. Why should they listen if he was not thinking of the political situation? The vice president understood what the president did not, namely that members of Congress do not sit around waiting to admire the most detailed moral ideal from the president. They are much more practical and political than that. Still, Mondale was never elected president, and Jimmy was.<\/p>\n Eizenstat concludes Carter\u2019s detailed choices led to successes on energy, Camp David, and the Panama Canal Treaty. But they also led to many losses, especially with Iran and the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Good News. <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Energy.<\/em><\/strong> In Eizenstat\u2019s mind, energy is one of the topics that shows Carter\u2019s strengths and weaknesses. Eizenstat is still disappointed that Campaigner Jimmy Carter promised an energy program within 90 days of becoming president, and then as president went after it as an early goal of his presidency. Energy is like many topics in the book; in the long run, the policy was incredibly successful, even to this day<\/em>, but as president he paid a \u201csevere political cost\u201d[21]<\/a> for it.<\/p>\n In the energy chapters, Eizenstat demonstrates that Carter\u2019s \u201cpure and principled version of government\u201d[22]<\/a> did not match that of his colleagues, especially the members of Congress who viewed the world differently. Unlike other presidents, Carter was not for deal-making, horse trading, or bargaining to try to get Congress to vote with him. As noted above, he believed they should vote with him because he had the right program. The fact that Carter \u201cwould not play Washington\u2019s roughhouse politics\u201d[23]<\/a>made political accomplishments, including the energy program, more difficult for him to achieve.<\/p>\n The energy loss and<\/em> victory, at the same time, were typical of many of Carter\u2019s accomplishments. Oddly enough, Eizenstat writes that Carter \u201cstruggled more than any other president with energy, accomplished far more, and suffered politically for it\u201d.[24]<\/a> \u00a0He also says Carter \u201cwas wounded but he had won.\u201d Eizenstat attributes the U.S. energy revolution, and the current success of our energy situation, to the success of Carter\u2019s four years:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The energy wars he fought for four years are also a metaphor for the Carter presidency: great accomplishments achieved by unartful means and at great political cost<\/em>. Carter paid a frightful political price for leading the country to a coherent energy policy. No one realized more than Carter himself the political cost of his focus on energy; \u201cIt sapped our strength,\u201d he told me. Courageous as he was in pressing ahead, he barely got credit. Many of the benefits to the country of his energy programs were felt only after he left office, as they are even today<\/em>.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n That story describes a win, but a limited one. And yet it is the same story Eizenstat repeats about Carter\u2019s very dangerous political opposition to many congressional water products, where he was inflexible, and yet, in the long run, successful. As one of his aides said about Carter: \u201cHe just thought things were morally wrong. It wasn\u2019t just economically or environmentally bad; they were morally wrong and I think he just thought people who were supporting these pork-barrel projects were corrupt people\u201d.[26]<\/a> Carter\u2019s goal was not to help the corrupt.<\/p>\n The repeated energy story is that Carter had the moral vision to accomplish long-term goals but did not seek much political support for doing so.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Camp David<\/em><\/strong> was just the same. Eizenstat counts Camp David as another Carter accomplishment, a peace between Israel and Egypt still unbroken all these years later. Eizenstat thinks this agreement was \u201cwithout precedent\u201d[27]<\/a> in American history, and describes this situation as \u201cJimmy Carter at his best, with one goal, a few key actors, and a complex problem to solve\u201d.[28]<\/a><\/p>\n Jimmy Carter\u2019s religion influenced him to choose Middle East peace as one of his commitments, with the president explaining his \u201cstrong religious motivation to try to bring peace to what I call the Holy Land\u201d.[29]<\/a> And, in yet another striking description of Carter\u2019s character, Eizenstat describes \u201ca characteristically Carteresque stance of I\u2019d-rather-be-right-than-reelected<\/em>, he also told us that he felt so strongly about peace in the Middle East that he was willing to lose the presidency<\/em> to achieve peace for Israel\u201d.[30]<\/a> And, of course, he did lose the presidential election in 1980, with the lowest percentage of the Jewish vote ever received by a Democrat. Some of them did not like that he had preached that the Jews had killed Jesus. Many Jewish voters continue to criticize him, especially after the 2006 publication of his book, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid<\/em>, which was also critical of Israel.<\/p>\n Carter\u2019s goal for peaceful success also affected the way he ran the negotiations. He focused on the foreign policy aspects of the situation, and ignored American Jewish domestic politics even while he was discussing the future of Israel. He thought he could insulate foreign policy from domestic politics, achieving his moral goals of peace and not merely protecting political rights.<\/p>\n As in the energy situation, whatever success he achieved was due to his usual attention to detail. Carter read everything about the land, its history, his negotiators, and their aides. No lawyers did his negotiating for him. He knew enough to do it himself, and to keep going even when any resolution looked impossible. His work, not his aides\u2019 commitments, led the way.<\/p>\n Yet even this arguably successful decision had many flaws. Eizenstat concludes the Camp David work itself was not bad, but much was \u201cleft undone\u201d.[31]<\/a>\u00a0 Carter had wanted a much bigger agreement, with more parties involved and with a settlement for the Palestinian people. Yet the peace was only a \u201ccold peace.\u201d And, most strikingly, Carter received only 40% of the Jewish vote in the 1980 election, the lowest of any modern Democrat.<\/p>\n Once again, something that looks long-term successful may not bring any help in the short run. Camp David was mentioned when Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002<\/em>, not while he was president.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Panama Canal Treaty<\/em><\/strong> is another huge, lasting accomplishment built on Carter\u2019s commitment to principle. The treaty gave Panama control over the canal that was then held by the United States. \u201cHe was not the first president to try, but he was the first to succeed, and once again he paid a political price for doing \u2018the right thing<\/em>\u2019\u201d.[32]<\/a>The right thing was to come to a different arrangement on the Panama Canal. The treaty was also a step toward a human rights policy in Latin America, which many years later was viewed as having saved thousands of Latin American lives.[33]<\/a><\/p>\n With Panama, in contrast to other votes, Carter actually did his unliked <\/em>presidential job of calling Senators to line up their pro-Treaty votes. \u201cNo president in modern times disliked this kind of horse-trading more than Jimmy Carter, yet here he realized that a defeat of his first major foreign-policy venture would be so serious, and the consequences of a loss so grave for America\u2019s prestige, that he had to swallow his distaste\u201d.[34]<\/a> About half the pro-Treaty Senators were not reelected either. But Carter\u2019s hard work helped to persuade them to take the drastic, pro-treaty step. Here doing something he did not like resulted in the eventual passage of the treaty. So apparently Carter would<\/em> do political work when it was absolutely required for the success of a foreign program.<\/p>\n Panama was one step in Carter\u2019s bigger human rights policy. Eizenstat identifies Carter as the \u201cfirst American president to apply human rights to U.S. foreign policy as a novel organizing principle\u201d.[35]<\/a> Yet human rights were a mixed bag for Carter as president. Human rights looked too idealistic to Carter\u2019s critics, who thought of him as a \u201cna\u00efve moralist\u201d.[36]<\/a> Eizenstat, however, views him as \u201cat once a moralist and a realist\u201d.[37]<\/a> The moralist won on Camp David and Panama Canal.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Those were the successes. Other episodes were much less positive.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Bad News. <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The Soviet Union<\/em><\/strong> demonstrates both sides of the moral president who was committed to human rights and wanted peace. Early in his administration, Carter emphasized human rights, and made them a significant part of his foreign policy. Rights were intertwined with his dealings with the Middle East, the Panama Canal, and the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n The human rights policy was tough on the Soviets, with Carter expressing support for known Soviet dissidents. Eizenstat concludes every president from Truman to George H.W. Bush did something about the Soviet Union, but Jimmy Carter\u2019s \u201chas been least appreciated\u201d.[38]<\/a> Eizenstat believes the human rights program exposed the weakest parts of Soviet society, and that post-presidency documents show Carter\u2019s human rights policy inspired Czechoslovakia\u2019s Vaclav Havel and Poland\u2019s Lech Walesa to fight for the freedom of their <\/em>countries. Eizenstat draws a positive message about Carter\u2019s rights policy: \u201cBut human rights add a moral element that is consistent with American values and remains to this day an important ingredient that was missing in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger model and that of the Trump administration, as well. When presidents after Jimmy Carter ignored human rights concerns, they opened themselves to criticism for failing to reflect values that are an element of America\u2019s attraction and a source of its power\u201d.[39]<\/a><\/p>\n But the legacy on the Soviet Union and human rights is mixed. Only a month after the hostages were taken in Iran, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, proving national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski\u2019s harsh perspective on the Soviet Union was more accurate than Secretary of State Cyrus Vance\u2019s more optimistic one. Suddenly, in December 1979, Carter had to be even tougher on the Soviet Union. He was. He put economic sanctions on them, reinstated the American draft, and cancelled American participation in the Soviet Olympics.<\/p>\n In other words, like so many parts of his presidency, sometimes the moral human rights policy worked but other times it did not.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Iran Hostages<\/em><\/strong>. <\/strong>The hostages were captured in Iran in November 1979, after Carter decided to admit the ill Shah of Iran to the United States. When Eizenstat woke up in April 1980, and learned of Carter\u2019s failed effort to rescue the hostages from Iran, he wrote, \u201cFor all practical purposes the election was over\u201d.[40]<\/a> Eizenstat believes that the Ayatollah Khomeini outsmarted the Americans, who did not yet comprehend radical Islam. Eizenstat thinks American intelligence officials were far behind in understanding what was going on with the shah, Iran, and the Islamic revolution.<\/p>\n It is still<\/em> interesting to read that Carter was the last in his administration <\/em>to think that the sick Shah should be admitted to the United States. As Carter\u2019s Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, told Eizenstat, \u201cThe president was the last holdout, fearing another attack on the embassy. Carter was the only person who was \u2018skeptical and did not want to let him in,\u2019 . . . and the president was the only person in his inner circle who actually predicted the outcome: \u2018What are you guys going to advise me to do when they overrun our embassy now and take our people hostage?\u2019\u201d.[41]<\/a><\/p>\n How different the presidency might have been if Carter had followed his own instincts on the shah\u2019s admission, as he did in so many different situations. Post-seizure, however, he lived by his own ideals, which both his aides and outsiders often criticized. Brzezinski would have bombed Tehran, but Carter wouldn\u2019t think of it. Brzezinski had thought of Carter as \u201cgutsy,\u201d but on the hostage issue he said Carter \u201chad this preoccupation with \u2018quote-unquote \u201cpeace\u201d\u2019\u201d.[42]<\/a> Zbig believed the peace commitment was based in Carter\u2019s religion, so that he could be tough, for example, in his Middle East negotiations \u201cbecause peace was the objective\u201d.[43]<\/a> Soon after the seizure of the hostages, Carter told the hostages\u2019 parents that he would do nothing to endanger their children, even though others were willing to risk the hostages\u2019 death through military means. Carter retained his commitment to peace from their seizure until the end of his presidency.<\/p>\n Carter even told one aide that Khomeini wouldn\u2019t kill the hostages because Khomeini was religious.[44]<\/a> The aide pointed out in response that Khomeini\u2019s religion was different from Carter\u2019s. On this issue, Eizenstat draws a conclusion we have heard before: \u201cBut he simply placed the safety of the hostages higher on his scale of priorities than the damage to American prestige and his own political standing<\/em>\u201d.[45]<\/a>Carter stopped travelling for his presidential campaign against Senator Ted Kennedy, thinking it was better, and more presidential, for him to stay in the Rose Garden and keep an eye on the hostages. Later in the campaign, a last-minute offer from Iran, as he was running against Republican Ronald Reagan, also caused Carter to stop campaigning due to the crisis.<\/p>\n This issue depends on how you look at it. The hostages did get out alive, but only after Reagan had taken office. Carter was driven to that result by a huge moral commitment to the hostages\u2019 safety above all else. In the recent Washington Post <\/em>story<\/a>[46]<\/u><\/a>, even Carter said, \u201cI may have overemphasized the plight of the hostages when I was in my final year, . . . But I was so obsessed with them personally, and with their families, that I wanted to do anything to get them home safely, which I did.\u201d<\/p>\n The real damage may have been in the failed rescue mission rather than in the seizure itself. Even Eizenstat believed, as it occurred, that the failed seizure would cost Carter reelection. \u00a0We are left to wonder what would have happened if the hostages were successfully rescued. Or if Carter had never admitted the shah of Iran into the United States.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Good News Turned Into Bad News or Bad Into Good? <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThe Consumer Populist\u201d<\/em><\/strong>.[47]<\/a> <\/strong>Those of us who lived through the Carter era remember Carter for dealing with a horrible economy, He was cursed, in particular, with terrible inflation. Carter spent a lot of his time trying to cure the economic hurdles that this country faced. Those were the days of the gasoline shortages, with resulting long lines at the gasoline stations. Indeed, on the economy, Eizenstat concludes, \u201cHe was now doing what he had hoped to avoid: fight inflation through a slowdown or even recession, to the dismay of the core Democrats. It is one reason he was not reelected\u201d.[48]<\/a><\/p>\n Nonetheless, Eizenstat concludes Carter was \u201cthe most consumer-friendly populist in the nation\u2019s history\u201d.[49]<\/a> Apparently a lot of the consumerism came from Carter\u2019s deregulation<\/em> of much of the government, which was not a traditionally Democratic thing to do. That is not really surprising, of course, as he was never a traditional Democrat. A lot of this deregulation was undertaken because Carter had to conduct a huge fight against inflation.\u00a0 Eizenstat argues that Carter chose competition, not regulation. Once again, deregulation had \u201clasting benefits that became evident only after he left office\u201d.[50]<\/a><\/p>\n After he left office, however, Reagan and industry fought the consumer movement so it was never as big again. \u201cConsumerism never recovered from Carter\u2019s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980\u201d.[51]<\/a> So, once again, Carter\u2019s accomplishment is only partial victory and later loss.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Famous Malaise Speech, July 15, 1979<\/em><\/strong>. <\/strong>Carter never used the word malaise<\/em> in that famous speech. The speech itself received wonderful praise from commentators and the audience itself, the American people. However, there were some odd things connected with it, which leave it marked in history as a negative rather than a positive accomplishment.<\/p>\n Carter cancelled a planned energy speech that was supposed to occur early in July. He went on retreat, and faced severe criticism there from invited outsiders. Nonetheless, after this weird retreat, he gave a great speech that doesn\u2019t use the word malaise and that seemed to get great reactions from the American people. Malaise appeared in the newspapers because it was leaked from the White House, and it still sticks with the speech. But Carter himself never uttered \u201cmalaise.\u201d<\/p>\n The malaise speech could have been a positive event. But then Carter upset it with \u201chis own unforced error\u201d.[52]<\/a> \u201cThe president literally stepped on his winning lines\u201d in that speech.[53]<\/a> Eizenstat called it the \u201cAchilles\u2019 Heel of the Anti-Politician\u201d.[54]<\/a> In other words, soon after the speech was over, Carter disrupted his successful speech by firing cabinet members<\/em>. Mondale was so upset with the speech and the firings that he almost resigned. Once again, his political judgment seems better in retrospect than Carter\u2019s ever was.<\/p>\n Of course, Mondale was never elected President of the United States, losing to Ronald Reagan in the 1984 election.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Other Important Issues: Health, Race, Gender, and Religion<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Eizenstat is sad today that the Carter administration did not pass health insurance. He believes this failure was consistent with Carter\u2019s early plan to emphasize energy instead of health. On health care, there was a series of negotiations and disagreements with Senator Ted Kennedy. Especially given Carter\u2019s constant concerns about the bad economy, he was reluctant to pass a huge, expensive, health program. Kennedy, in contrast, wanted a much bigger program that would meet all his health care goals.<\/p>\n Eizenstat looks back with regret, but it is a good reminder to us of what happens when compromise is not available. Eizenstat says \u201cthe missed opportunity haunts me to this day\u201d.[55]<\/a> According to him, the \u201cdemise of the Carter plan was a political tragedy for the president and a health care tragedy for Americans\u201d.[56]<\/a><\/p>\n Carter had an important, but mixed, record on race, gender and religion. Carter had known both Martin Luther Kings, Senior and Junior, when he was governor of Georgia. He long supported African American rights. African Americans continued to back Carter, who took their side in the past and did so through the presidency.<\/p>\n Governor Carter originally received a lot of attention for his governor\u2019s inaugural speech, when he said\u2014untypically for a Southerner\u2014\u201cI say to you quite frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over. Never again shall a black child be deprived of equal rights to education, health or social services\u201d.[57]<\/a> Time <\/em>magazine put him on its cover for this unusual stance, and that helped elect him to the presidency. As governor, he also put a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the governor\u2019s mansion. Moreover, only his family and one other man had opposed a vote to bar African Americans from worship in his home church in Plains, Georgia.<\/p>\n On race, Carter\u2019s Justice Department was involved with the famous affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke<\/a><\/em>.[58]<\/a> Carter and his aides did not like the Department of Justice\u2019s first brief, which supported Bakke, the white man who was denied admission to the university. Carter and his aides did not like the DOJ\u2019s second brief either. Eventually DOJ lawyer Drew Days developed a brief more positive to affirmative action, which the administration supported. In a 5-4 decision, the Court allowed some affirmative action. But, Eizenstat points out, racial events like this enabled Ronald Reagan to play the race card against Carter during the 1980 campaign.<\/p>\n Unlike Reagan, President Carter also battled segregationists from the White House. By 1976, the South was full of segregated private religious schools created to keep students from Brown<\/em>\u2019s integrated public schools. North Carolina\u2019s Goldsboro Christian Schools [GCS] and South Carolina\u2019s Bob Jones University [BJU] were representative of the segregation academies and universities.<\/p>\n Carter provoked the segregationist churches in two ways. First, in the Supreme Court his Justice Department defended the IRS\u2019s ruling that GCS and BJU were not entitled to tax exemptions and deductions because they discriminated on the basis of race. The Carter administration\u2019s position won the case in 1983, even though President Reagan had decided to support BJU instead of the IRS. Second, Carter\u2019s IRS Commissioner, Jerome Kurtz, enforced the tax exemption and deduction rule against all racially discriminatory schools, including religious schools. According to<\/a> the Reverend Jerry Falwell, the founder of the Moral Majority, \u201c[i]t was the IRS trying to take away our tax exemptions that made us realize that we had to fight for our lives.\u201d The three original organizations of the Christian Right\u2014the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, and Religious Roundtable\u2014were all formed during the Carter administration<\/em> to defend segregated schools. They then added numerous other items to their agendas.<\/p>\n Carter\u2019s record on gender was more divided, with women disagreeing whether he adequately supported women\u2019s rights\u2014or not. Carter\u2014or at least Rosalynn Carter\u2014endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Carter also appointed numerous women officials in his administration. He notably changed appointments to the judiciary, naming the largest number of women ever. Although there was only one woman judge when he was elected, by the end of his presidency there were forty, more than five times the amount of all his predecessors. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg later gave Carter credit for opening the doors to women like herself. Although he promised to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court, probably Shirley Hufstedler, he never had the opportunity. President Reagan kept Carter\u2019s promise when he named Sandra Day O\u2019Connor in 1981.<\/p>\n Some women critics, however, think Carter should have done more to support ERA. They also criticized him about abortion. Although he\u2014reluctantly\u2014supported Roe v. Wade<\/em>,[59]<\/a> he notoriously also accepted the Court\u2019s refusal to fund abortion, announcing in a public speech that \u201clife is not fair.\u201d That reaction was seen as a blow to women\u2019s rights. Carter also had recurring problems with NOW\u2019s Eleanor Smeal and Representative Bella Abzug about just how far his support of women\u2019s equality went.<\/p>\n Ironically, this most religious president turned many religious voters over to Ronald Reagan and his Republican successors. As noted above, the religious voters were angry with Carter for taking away tax-exempt status from racially discriminatory schools, as in the Bob Jones<\/em> case. Carter was also accused of being a secular humanist who wrongly supported LGBT rights, opposed government funding of religion and government prayer, and supported abortion. In 1980, 2\/3 of the white evangelical Southern Christian vote went for Reagan. In the end, Reagan won 480 electoral votes to Carter\u2019s 49. As Eizenstat concludes, the \u201cmarriage of Christian evangelical and secular conservatives became a significant force behind the Reagan landslide and remains a crucial part of the Republican coalition today\u201d.[60]<\/a> In the long run, a separationist president led to a more religious government. Reagan\u2019s successors, both Republican and Democrat, have continued the pro-religious trend. Such faith-based politics have become the norm since Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency as a devout Christian in 1976 and then disappointed Evangelicals who found his policies too liberal.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Conclusion: What Should We Think of Carter\u2019s Morality? <\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Eizenstat\u2019s book is not surprising. It confirms what we suspected, namely that Carter\u2019s moral and religious commitments were often more important than his political ones. Not always. As the book points out, Carter \u201ccould turn on a dime when the campaign season began\u201d.[61]<\/a> But most of the time, he was not thinking of politics or reelection.<\/p>\n Repeatedly Carter went forward with action despite its political costs. Consider energy, Camp David, the Soviet Union, Iran, or abortion, where he fought for his positions without caring about the political impacts. Occasionally Carter undertook better political actions\u2014like calling the Senators about the Panama Canal Treaty\u2014in order to reach his goal. But not always.<\/p>\n Eizenstat concludes Carter \u201cwas not guided by the Bible in making his decisions, but his faith helped sustain him during the traumas of office\u201d.[62]<\/a> His faith also seemed to provide Carter\u2019s lasting commitments to peace, truth, justice, and ethical and moral values, no matter what the political cost<\/em>. Carter does not believe his successors are always governed by those principles.<\/p>\n The book shows that lasting accomplishments can come out of a president\u2019s commitment to ethical principles. However, it leaves open the questions of compromise and political focus. On health insurance and Iran, for example, Carter might have been more successful if he had sought a more compromising, middle-ground plan of action. The book shows that a one-term president can accomplish a lot by sticking with his moral principles and basing his accomplishments upon them. It also suggests, however, that Carter might have achieved more if he had both willingly compromised and been aware of the political impacts of his actions. His successors–Reagan, Clinton, Bush 2, and Obama–seem to have been much more politically astute than Carter was. Maybe Bush 1 was not, and so did not win reelection against the very-politically-astute Bill Clinton? The book leaves us debating that question.<\/p>\n The book also raises questions about a religion-based administration. From history\u2019s perspective, it looks good that Carter was so moral. But his actions did make it possible for his successors to be even more directly religious. Politicians like Carter, Clinton, Bush 2, and Obama frequently began their analysis of difficult policy questions with their moral and religious insights and then translated those perspectives into public policy, whether directly or indirectly. At this effort, too, it seemed that his successors were much more politically smart about how to use religion than Carter was. Sometimes they hid their religion, even when it was influencing them. These three were reelected, and instinctively seemed to have a better sense of how their actions would play\u2014or not\u2014politically.<\/p>\n In my view, however, in the long run, religion-based politics has been more divisive than unitive, frequently favoring selected groups\u2019 religious interests over constitutional values. Our current political and legal system, which seems to favor the actor\u2019s good political insight, is in danger of encouraging everyone\u2014presidents, legislators, citizens, and even judges\u2014to apply their personal vision of life to the political problem. That approach may divide the nation into blocs of religious believers united by faith instead of a whole nation bound to a common constitution. The book convinces me that the question about morality\u2019s appropriate role in politics is still open.<\/p>\n And that active Christians continue to disagree about the problem of dirty hands, as they have for centuries.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n *<\/a>\u00a0 William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas School of Law. I am grateful to David Tanenhaus for his thoughts on this essay, and to Christine Corcos and Hedgehogs and Foxes <\/em>for help with publication.<\/p>\n Copyright \u00a9 Leslie C. Griffin 2019<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Stuart E. Eizenstat, President Carter: The White House Years (NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2018), at 1.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a>Id. <\/em>at 5.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 84 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 469.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 558 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 469.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan<\/em>, The Un-Celebrity President: Jimmy Carter Shuns Riches, Lives Modestly in his Georgia Hometown, <\/em>The Washington Post, Aug. 17, 2018, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/national\/wp\/2018\/08\/17\/feature\/the-un-celebrity-president-jimmy-carter-shuns-riches-lives-modestly-in-his-georgia-hometown\/?utm_term=.26b20a338c22<\/a>.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Leslie Griffin, The Problem of Dirty Hands<\/em>, 17 Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (1989).<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Interview by Ralph Blodgett with Jimmy Carter, in The Church and the State<\/em>, Liberty, Sept.\/Oct. 1976, reprinted in<\/em> Jimmy Carter, 1 The Presidential Campaign 1976 974-76 (1978); see Carter Reassures Jews<\/em>, Facts on File World News Digest, 1976 Digest, at 410 n.3.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Eizenstat supra<\/em>. note 1, at 5.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 14.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 3.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 14.<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Id. <\/em>at 1.<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Id<\/em>.<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 1-2.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 85.<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 86 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Eizenstat, supra <\/em>note 1 at 141.<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Id<\/em>. at 183.<\/p>\n